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Non-technical Summary
Biotechnology offers an example of a recent booming high-technology industry, in which
Germany gradually caught up with the leading countries in Europe. Based on
technologies derived from the latest results in molecular biology, genetics, biochemistry,
informatics or physics, the development of new therapeutics or diagnostics (“red”
biotechnology), new products or services for the agricultural and food markets (“green”
biotechnology) or for environmental activities (“grey” biotechnology) require substantial
financial resources over a long period of time.
From a theoretical point of view, newly created biotechnology firms carrying out such
R&D activities face a restriction of both internal finance (mainly due to limited sales) and
external finance in the form of loans from credit institutions. As a result, private equity
investors – especially venture-capital companies (“VC-companies”) and corporate
investors (i.e. established firms investing in young innovative firms) – seem to be the
most appropriate financing partners for new biotechnology companies. In regard to their
advantages (risk pooling, risk diversification etc.) to deal with information asymmetries
compared to private equity investors, VC-companies are expected to invest in the riskiest
biotechnology projects, namely in firms developing new healthcare applications and
technology platforms in the healthcare field. Corporate investors, wishing to diversify
their activities, should invest more than VC-companies in supplier firms. Due to their
dependence on technological innovations which have been developed by biotechnology
companies, pharmaceutical and chemical industries could also be expected to actively
fund innovative health care firms. The importance of equity investors in the emergence of
the biotechnology industry in Germany has never been empirically studied. Based on data
of 378 companies (derived from a combination of two databases) founded between 1995
and 1999, this paper investigates the role of VC-companies and corporate investors in
funding newly created biotechnology firms in Germany. A descriptive and a multivariate
analysis – that allows to eliminate pseudo-correlation effects - were carried out. Both
provide empirical evidence for the significant role that VC-companies did, in fact, play in
the creation of these innovative firms: more than 15% of them received venture capital
between 1995 and 1999, which lies far ahead of the average participation of venture
capital in other industries. This therefore supports the fact that VC-investments play a
critical role in the  early stages of risky biotechnology companies.
Differentiating between three business models for biotechnology firms (product, service
and supplier companies) highlights the clear preference of VC-companies for product
developers (31% of them were venture-backed), especially from the healthcare sector.
Strikingly, established industries like the pharmaceutical or the chemistry, invested only
marginally in biotechnology firms that develop innovative therapeutics or diagnostics
(only 2% of these firms received an equity investment from an industrial corporation).
This surprising reluctance from industrial corporations can be explained by a strong focus
on in-house R&D and their preference for strategic alliances (without equity investment)
with innovative firms,  which allows them to secure access to innovations but also to
minimize their risks. Multivariate analyses confirm these conclusions: product and
service companies in the healthcare field are most likely to receive venture capital,
whereas specialized suppliers in all biotechnology fields (red, green and grey) are favored
by equity investors.
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11 Introduction
Germany’s biotechnology industry has evolved rapidly since 1995 and has reached
the top position in Europe regarding the number of biotechnology companies in
2000 (Ernst & Young, 2002). A substantial increase in firm creation activities is
typical for new industries, offering enormous technological and entrepreneurial
opportunities (Klepper, 1996). Last mentioned opportunities exist for firms not only
developing new drugs (“red sector”) but also solving environmental (“grey sector”)
as well as agricultural problems (“green sector”). The value chain within the
biotechnology industry contains further services and supplying activities. Both
activities also offer attractive entrepreneurial and technological opportunities within
the value chain of the application development process. Platform technologies such
as the Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) technique are well known examples for the
important services which accelerate the development process. Based on differences
in national institutional framework, Germany is more focused on the use of this kind
of technology compared to the UK biotechnology industry (Casper and Kettler,
2001).
This paper seeks to analyze the role of venture capital (VC) companies and
corporate investors in financing German biotechnology companies. Access to equity
partners may have considerable economic benefits, measured by the number of new
applications and firm performance (e.g. Powell et al., 1999; Engel and Keilbach,
2002). Venture capital is currently best suited to reduce the funding gap of young
high-tech companies (Amit et al., 1998; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). Already
existing studies highlight the role of VC-companies measured by the number and the
amount of investments or analyze a specific segment of biotechnology companies
(Ernst & Young, 2002). However, a comprehensive study about the relevance of
2different private equity investors is missing.1 We emphasize a wide definition of
biotechnology industry in accordance with the OECD-definition2 to consider the
wide range of technological and entrepreneurial opportunities.
We expect that the importance of equity partners differs according to the product
strategy of the biotechnology company. Venture capital companies focus on equity
financing of high-tech projects with uncertain returns. Corporate investors avoid
equity financing of these projects. They are suitable partners to pay for a successful
development process in order to get the control rights. Furthermore, opportunities in
the supplier industry are mostly attractive for incumbents with similar activities. Our
empirical results confirm that: VC-companies are most important for firms
developing new drugs or platform technologies. They are of little importance to
suppliers. The results for corporate investors are confirmed. They tend to avoid
equity ventures in high-innovative biotech firms.
The paper first considers the need and emergence of external finance for young
biotechnology companies from a theoretical point of view in chapter two. The
discussion highlights the motives of VC-companies and corporate investors, in
regards to finance as well as being present in the biotechnology industry. Following
a description of the database in chapter three, we analyze the financing structure of
German biotechnology industry in chapter four. We start with a descriptive analysis
in chapter four to get an insight for preferences, i.e. the favored product strategy and
targeted market, as venture capitalists and corporate investors. Based on a
multivariate analysis in chapter five we check for a pseudo correlation of the
observed pattern. The paper ends with the presentation of the main results and a
discussion of some implications in chapter six.
                                          
1 Some evidence exists for other new industries. Best example in our point of view is the study of
Burg and Kenney (2000) who highlight the role of venture capitalists during the creation
process of Local Area Networking (LAN) industry.
32 Conceptual Framework
A Need for Private Equity
Newly created biotech firms carrying out research and development projects face
financial problems that are typical for young innovative companies3. One specificity
of the biotechnology sector is the high level of financing that is required over a long
period of time to carry out R&D projects. As a matter of fact, development costs for
a new drug – from biological target identification to authorization to
commercialization - amount to 500 million US-dollars (Ollig, 2001, p.24).
According to Myers’ (1984, 1986) pecking order theory, empirically tested and
supported in the small business environment by Norton (1991), Holmes and Kent
(1994), entrepreneurs or managers tend to first resort to internal finance. External
finance comes only as a second choice and when it is required, firms issue the safest
security first, such as loan. External equity financing comes only as a last resort.
This ranking is especially true for low-innovative firms. In the case of high-
innovative firms experiencing long periods of time without significant sales, a loan
is only attractive if repayment starts some years after taking it out. Other studies
such as Watson (2002), Jordan et al (1998) and Howorth (1999) all point out that a
companies choice for financing their activities will be conformable with the pecking
order theory.
Internal finance is very restricted for young, innovative biotechnology firms
developing new technologies or products. Significant sales are absent and the
                                                                                                                                         
2 OECD Definition of Biotechnology: 'The application of science and technology to living
organisms, as well as parts, products and models thereof, to alter living or non-living materials
for the production of knowledge, goods and services'
3 In our understanding, innovations comprise technologically new products (goods or services) or
processes and significant technological improvements in products and processes, according to
the OECD definition (OECD, 1997).
4entrepreneur’s personal funds are insufficient as confirmed for example by an
empirical study carried out by Champenois4. Government R&D-subsidies can be
acquired to increase the internal finance resources.5  However, subsidies are very
limited regarding the amount and intended purpose.
The second preferred option (loans) is usually of very limited access to innovative
biotechnology companies as a result of imperfections in the credit market and
suitability of this kind of instrument. Credit institutions know the risk of insolvency
for all firms but they face a high uncertainty level (in the sense of Knight 1921,
concerning the inability to forecast, as opposed to risk) regarding the individual
project quality. Furthermore, credit institutions are less experienced in evaluating
most innovative business ideas. As a result, information asymmetries are to be
found, characterized by differences between loaner and entrepreneur regarding the
assessment of project quality. Similarly to the situation on the market for “lemons”
(Akerlof, 1970), information asymmetries lead to adverse selection: projects of
lesser quality than expected are financed. To prevent that risk and attract good
projects, credit institutions offer lower interest rates. However, this results in a credit
rationing effect, since the demand for loans exceeds the supply for the offered
interest rate (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). One more reason for credit limitation comes
from the little suitability of loans. Exorbitant high interest rates are necessary to
compensate the high default risk, the low probability for financial success of R&D
projects investments. However, entrepreneurs in early business stages can only pay
limited interest rates. Furthermore, high-tech investments are intangible and hence,
often have a limited collateral value for loan security (for a more detailed discussion
see Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). Public loans are no suitable instruments to reduce
                                          
4 An empirical qualitative investigation that took place in 2003-2003 as a part of Champenois’
Ph.D research work (not published yet) showed that out of 18 interviewed high-innovative
German biotechnology firms, 50 percent had received founders’ funding (on top of common
capital stock), with a maximal value of 250,000 euro in a single case.
5the financial gap: their allocation depends on the readiness of the person or company
giving the loan to take over fully or partly the default risk, and this readiness is very
restricted in case of high information asymmetries. As a result, in consideration of
the pecking order theory one can expect  that an external finance alternative (equity
finance) to be of great relevance for innovative biotechnology companies and of
little importance for suppliers with standardized, well-known production process .
Different Types of Private Equity Investors
Equity investors can be divided into two categories: a classical informal one,
comprising private investors “business angels” and corporate investors, i.e.
enterprises that have traditionally invested sporadically in innovative firms, and a
recent formal one, consisting of newly created venture capital companies “VC-
companies” whose activity is precisely to buy equity stakes of young firms.
“Business angels” face the same market imperfections as banks regarding
information asymmetries. Furthermore, the finance amount required in
biotechnology often exceeds their own capabilities.6 On the contrary, corporate
investors and “VC-companies” have greater financial capabilities than “business
angels”. Therefore, they represent likelier financing partners for young innovative
companies.
VC-companies are a new category: their number and activities have substantially
increased in Germany, like in the rest of Europe, since the establishment and
acceptance of new stock markets in the mid-90’s (see Engel, 2003). VC-companies
act as intermediaries between outside investors and young innovative firms. They do
not only provide their ventures with funds but also with management support and
                                                                                                                                         
5 The first institutional subsidy was given in 1975 by a private foundation. In 1985 the German
Government presented their first program to foster biology and biotechnology. The most
important program was arranged in 1995 with the BioRegio competiton.
6 Business angels invest on average 125,000 to 500,000 euro in a company. (Source: Interview
with German Business Angel Club; Nathusius, 2001)
6advice. Most of them pursue a purely financial goal, which is maximizing their
return on investments.7 VC-companies enjoy significant advantages over single
private equity investors, including corporate investors, when high information
asymmetries exist. Above all, through their specialization in equity investments in
innovative firms, VC-companies gain experience over time. Learning effects occur,
which enable them to reduce information asymmetries to a bigger extent than non-
specialized actors. In addition, risk pooling represents a major resource for them to
address information asymmetries (Amit et al., 1998). As a matter of fact, investing
in many different companies increases the probability that, ex post considered, a few
successful projects were financed, which allow to compensate the losses from
unsuccessful projects.8 VC companies can also pursue a purposeful portfolio
strategy aiming at reducing risks: they can diversify their investments throughout
different firm development stages as well as different technologies and products
(biotechnology, medical devices, information/communication technologies etc.).
In the venture capitalists’ view, the expectation of high financial returns is mainly
correlated with the size and growth of markets targeted by the young innovative
firm.9 In the biotechnology industry, the health care - especially human medicine –
branch is the largest market for biotechnology companies and it is expected to grow
most significantly in the next years. Mainly due to population aging, the
pharmaceutical market is expected to rise worldwide from $ 300 billion in 1998 to $
980 billion in 2015 (Ollig, 2001). Biotechnology therapeutic products (like
recombinant proteins or monoclonal antibodies) are expected to gain an increasing
                                          
7 The German venture capital market is characterized by different groups of venture capitalists:
Independent companies, private companies as well as public bank-owned companies (Engel,
2003). Companies from the last group tend to require  lower minimum internal rates of return
than the others.
8 Gebhardt and Schmidt (2002, p. 241) point out that 20 to 30 percent of the overall VC-financed
projects end up in a failure; 60-70 percent survive at a low level; and 10 percent are „high
flyers“.
9 For an extensive discussion of VC investment criteria see Tyebjee and Bruno (1981, 1984),
Virtanen (1996).
7market share, since their success rate in clinical trials is ahead of conventional
chemical compounds (Gambardella, 2000): at the end of the 90’s,
biopharmaceuticals represented 10 percent of the pharmaceutical market and 6 out
of 10 newly approved drugs had been developed using biotechnology methods; by
2015, the share of biopharmaceuticals should jump to 25 percent, representing a $
200 billion market (Ollig, 2001). In the diagnostic market, biotechnology
innovations are also expected to gain market shares. As opposed to the situation in
the “red” biotechnology sector, the agricultural and food market (“green” biotech)
offers much less growth perspectives in Europe, due to a low level of acceptance
from users (farmers, consumers) as well as difficulties experienced in the technology
development, regulatory approval and adoption from the users processes. The
market for environmental applications (“grey” biotech) is economically insignificant
compared to the two previous ones.
A successful technological innovation is very often the key factor in gaining a
significant share of the targeted market. Venture capitalists particularly seek
“disruptive technologies” that offer a radically new solution to unsolved technical
problems from the industry or make activities currently carried out by the industry
significantly easier or cheaper (comparative advantage over existing methods) and,
therefore, enjoy a high probability of taking over a full market. The Polymerase
Chain Reaction (PCR) technique is an example of a disruptive technology. Before
the discovery of this technology in 1985, scientists wishing to copy DNA strands
had to go through a laborious (days- or weeks-long) procedure of inserting the DNA
sequences into bacterial DNA, growing large cultures of the sequence-carrying cells
and, finally, harvesting the desired DNA. PCR allowed them to produce in a few
hours more than a million copies from DNA samples in order to diagnose genetic
disorders or infectious diseases with a sample of genetic material that would have
been much too small earlier (The Scientist, 1989). In conclusion, companies
developing new healthcare applications and new technology platforms to develop
8these applications offer most attractive equity investment opportunities for VC-
companies within the biotechnology industry (hypothesis 1).
As far as incumbents are concerned, pharmaceutical or chemical corporations,
biotechnology firms and suppliers (manufacturers of laboratory equipment or
consumable material, for example) may all be willing to invest in a biotechnology
start-up. This can be differentiated between two types of corporate investors. A first
group identifies biotechnology as a new market niche offering attractive
opportunities for their existing products and decides to implement a diversification
strategy through an equity investment in a young biotechnology company. Suppliers
like machine manufacturers may be a good example of corporate investors from this
group. Occupying a strategic market is characterized by low risk of failure, because
the demand for goods and services is well-known when the new activity takes place
in early stages of the economic value chain process. Hence, corporate investors
comparatively are more related to finance companies in supplying industry via
equity than VC-companies (hypothesis 2).
A second group seeks new products or new technologies in order to make their own
production process more efficient, to be present in new markets or to remain present
in existing markets (Schween, 1996; McNally, 1997). These are objectives
especially pursued by pharmaceutical and chemical industries. These corporations
face a situation of dependence regarding innovations that have been developed by
biotechnology firms and that became key to new product developments and their
own R&D activities (Hamdouch and Depret, 2001; Buse, 2000): technologies like
genomics, proteomics, high-throughput screening, bioinformatics have established
themselves as industry standards for R&D activities and development of new
therapeutics, diagnostic kits, plant crops, etc10. Furthermore, dependence over new
                                          
10 For Hamdouch and Depret (2001, p.88), biotechnology represents the new innovation paradigm
for the pharmaceutical industry, replacing the old chemical paradigm that lead to a bottleneck in
the discovery of therapeutic innovations.
9biotechnology technologies and products is particularly important in the healthcare
sector (“red” biotechnology), characterized by a high “innovation pressure”: for
several years, pharmaceutical corporations have continuously proved unable to
discover innovative compounds (new chemical or molecular entities) to meet their
strategic objectives in terms of revenues.11. There is a high pressure to innovate
since numerous patents on blockbuster drugs - the few ones generating the main
revenues - are going to expire in the coming years, meaning a loss of exclusivity on
sales, hence a drastic decrease in revenues for the pharmaceutical industry12. To
address this challenge, pharmaceutical corporations may choose to make equity
investments in strategically relevant biotechnology firms.
However, one can expect equity investments from established corporations to be
limited, for three reasons. First, pharmaceutical corporations invest a large amount
in internal R&D genetic engineering inclusively. The leading German firms in this
sector invested 2,76 Mrd. Euros in R&D in the year 1998 and each fourth active
agent in pre-clinical stage based on genetic engineering (VFA, 2003, p. 22-24).
Second, large corporations are relatively risk-adverse, since they specialize their
investments in a few technologies and markets (which represent a strong strategic
impact), i.c. that they can seldom diversify their risks. The high volatility of
corporate venture capital activities (i.e. corporation-owned VC-companies to make
equity investments in innovative firms) can be used as an empirical evidence of the
risk-adversity of corporate investors: a significant increase in industry’s corporate
venture capital (CVC) activities was observed only after independent VC companies
                                          
11 Price Waterhouse Coopers (1998) point out: at the end of 1996, 41 large pharmaceutical
companies had 350 active compounds (new molecular entities) in clinical trials (Phase II or III),
which translates into 167 new drugs until 2001, i.e. 0.81 drug per year per company. This lies
far behind their strategic goals, which are above 2 new drugs a year (quoted by Ollig, 2001,
p.63). A similar conclusion is noted by Spaethe (2001), p. 216, referring to an article from the
Economist (1998).
12 Between the end of the 90’s and 2006, 100 therapeutics representing revenues of 37 Mrd $ are
going to lose patent protection (Ollig, 2001, p. 64).
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showed signs of success (Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Gompers, 2002)13. That is to
say: CVC units are second to move in during the boom stages of the venture capital
cycle and first to remove themselves in recession stages. Similar observations can be
made in Germany: most of CVC activities started there in 200014, three years later
after the first substantial increase in fundraising and investments on the VC market.
Risk adversity varies with the corporation’s size: the smaller incumbents are, the
greater their risk-adversity.
Third, other forms of alliances with innovative biotechnology companies, namely in-
licensing and/or co-development collaborations, acquisition of successful firms
allow corporate investors to meet their strategic goals and to minimize their risks. In
the first mentioned type of partnerships, incumbents couple financial payments with
success (milestones payments made by incumbents at achievement of technological
objectives; royalty payments – i.e. a given percentage of revenues paid to the
biotechnology firm when sales occur – coupled with market success). Therefore,
they can minimize the amount of their investment in case of a project failure.
Moreover, in-licensing/co-development collaborations allow them to invest in later
stages of the highly risky drug development process, hence to mitigate their risks15.
However, the a priori predefinition of payments can lead to trouble if market
acceptance  of new product is misjudged by corporate investors.
 A high preference for collaboration without equity investment is evidenced by
aggregated data16 as well as Champenois’ empirical research.17 Incumbent’s risk-
                                          
13 An above-average, dramatical decrease of CVC investments in the US market is evident in
2001 compared with the year before (Chesbrough, 2002).
14 BVK (1998) statistics counted four CVC companies as members focusing on early stage
activities in 1998 for the first time. The working group „CVC“ with 15 members have been
established in February of 2002 (BVK, 2002a).
15 Risks of failure along the drug development process are very high: out of 10,000 identified
biological targets, only one will lead to a new drug on the market.
16 The number of biotechnology alliances for the 20 largest pharmaceutical companies has soared
from 85 between 1990 and 1998 to 226 in the 1997-1998 period, and alliances with
11
adversity and the advantages of collaborations to meet their strategic goals leads to
hypothesis 3, corporate investors are less active in early stage equity funding of
biotechnology firms developing health care applications (“red” biotechnology).
Differences between corporate investors and VC-companies regarding their
objectives and strategy when engaging in equity investment in innovative
biotechnology firms are summarized in Table 1.
< insert Table 1 around here >
3 Database
The BIOCOM Database 2000 is the starting point for our empirical analysis. It
contains information about firm characteristics like business models defined via
product strategy and business field, patents and addresses of 1,205 biotechnology
companies based in Germany. However, a lack of information about the presence of
equity investors – and of which types -  is obvious. We have generated this
information by using firm-specific data from the ZEW Foundation Panel. This data
has been provided by the largest German credit rating agency “Creditreform” (see
Almus et al. 2000 for further explanations). We identified 89 percent of biotech
companies of BIOCOM Database in the ZEW-Foundation Panel.18
For a majority of biotech companies, the information in the ZEW-Foundation Panel
was delivered between 1998 and 2000 for the first time. Analysis about the role of
                                                                                                                                         
pharmaceutical industries accounted for 77 percent of total financing for biotechnology
companies in 1998 in the USA, compared to 13 percent in 1991 (Nicholson, 2002).
17 The previously mentioned qualitative empirical research revealed that out of 10 newly created
biotechnology companies in Germany having signed strategic collaborations (i.e. involving
licensing and/or product co-development) with incumbents, only two have received equity
funding from their industrial partner.
18 Identification based on a computer-assisted search for names and address of biotechnology
companies in ZEW-Foundation Panel (state: June 2002) which is widely used in other studies.
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equity investors at the foundation date only makes sense, if firms are young at the
time of data delivery. Here we can easily assume that shareholders at foundation
date are still active as a venturing partner. For older firms the probability for an exit
of a venturing partner increases rapidly. Hence, we focus on the financing structure
for biotech companies founded between 1995 and 1999. The strong increase of start-
up as well as VC-activities in the mid-1990s is a second motivation for the limitation
of the sample. Our sample contains 378 companies founded between 1995 and 1999.
To exclude derivative foundations (= existing business units within a firm turned
into a legally independent entity) we ignore companies with more than 250
employees at the time of the foundation. We have identified the VC-companies
based on a computer assisted search for members of associations and for companies
with obvious VC-activities (see Engel, 2003 for detailed information).19 The
remaining companies with links to biotechnology companies are included in the
group of corporate investors. We checked each record of venture by hand and re-
coded ventures of the companies.20 As a result, we can differentiate between
independent companies (no private equity investor has been identified), venture-
backed companies (involvement of one or more VC-companies), corporate venture-
backed companies (involvement of one or more corporate investors) and companies
which have received capital from VC-companies and from corporate investors.
                                          
19 Silent partnerships cannot be identified with this kind of procedure. They concern the
relationship between two or more partners inside a firm, are not recorded in the trade register
and difficult to observe by Creditreform. Fortunately, exclusively silent partnerships don’t play
an important role in early stage financing of venture capital companies (BVK, 2002b: 24, 31,
45).
20 Remember the following case: A management company is the owner of the biotechnology
company to save the tangable and intangable assets in case of bankruptcy.
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4 Descriptive Results
In this section we first aim at describing the methodology to classify different
business models21 of biotechnology firms. Secondly, we analyze the types of
financing structure (venture capital, industry investment or a combination of both)
according to business models and business fields.
As far as business models are concerned, we can distinguish between three different
cardinal points in the value chain of biotechnology and classify firms accordingly in
three categories:
1. Product company
2. Service company
3. Supplier company
Product companies engage in the R&D of primarily cell-based technologies in order
to develop new health care, agriculture or environment products. The products can
be therapeutics against major diseases (like Alzheimer's, Cancer, High Cholesterol,
HIV or Parkinson's), diagnostic kits, vaccine, tissue engineering systems, in the red
sector, or genetically modified seeds, in the green sector.
Service companies support and try to foster the R&D process of biotechnology
companies as well as chemical or pharmaceutical firms. Most of the so-called
platform technology companies are to be found in this group. They started to
increasingly pursue a product strategy mainly at the turn of the century. They
provide. Protein or DNA sequencing, screening, target validation, assay
development services or molecular biology analysis. A second group are the
“traditional” technical services or non-technical services such as consulting activities
e.g. regulatory support in the course of product development or administration of
14
external documents and monitoring of proceedings. Unfortunately, the BIOCOM
database does not differentiate between firms developing platform technologies and
firms offering traditional services.
The Supplier companies are responsible for the needs of the modern laboratory.
They provide Pipette Products, Calibration Services, biotechnology equipment or
production facilities.
In our empirical analysis, complexity arose through the fact that a given company
could be registered in our database under several business model types such as
product and service company. Seven different combinations of business models
were possible. To receive a better accuracy of discrimination, we restricted the
number of combinations to three in the descriptive analysis. The first category,
Product companies, contain firms which only develop new products. The second
one, Service companies, encompasses firms that either offer services only or
services and new products. The last group, Supplier companies, contain the
remaining firms (see Table 3). However, each of the seven combinations will be
taken into account in the multivariate analysis.
First, we would like to give an overview of the relevance of the different business
models and business fields for entrants (Table 4). The biotechnology industry in
Germany has grown rapidly over the last eight years (Ernst & Young, 2003). The
majority of companies are closely related to red biotechnology. This gives clear
evidence that in this sector there are more opportunities and probably a higher
chance to realize a revenue stream sooner than in other business fields. Green
biotechnology comes second and according to the figures in Table 4 the grey
biotechnology is barely considered by entrepreneurs. The suppliers still have a
significant occurrence in each business field which is related with less risky
                                                                                                                                         
21 A description of the operations of a business including the components of the business, the
functions of the business, and the revenues and expenses that the business generates . Here, we
15
circumstances and the possibility to acquire customers in the whole life science
industry.
< insert Table 4 around here >
In addition to venturous entrepreneurs and the new technologies, venture capital is
an important component of the biotechnology business as evidenced by Table 5 that
presents the different types of venturing partners according to business models: 15.6
percent of all biotechnology firms exclusively received Venture Capital between
1995 and 1999. Other financing patterns like Corporate Venture Capital,
investments by larger companies or co-venturing are unincisive. Exclusive
investments by established companies such as from the Chemistry or Pharmaceutical
industry have at least a share of 10 percent between 1995 and 1999. That is to say
big companies from related industries have a certain but limited interest in financing
start-ups in the early stages via private equity. One possible reason for this is that big
pharmaceutical firms prefer strategic alliances over private equity investments. To
receive a better understanding of these numbers, Table 2 gives an overview of
Venture Capital involvement in other industries. In particular, it appears that VC-
companies are closely connected to the High-Tech sector but even this close
connection leads just into a share of 2% Venture Backed firms related to the
potential demand for VC. Other industries like Manufacturing (1%) or Trade (0.6%)
are not even close to 2%. The data suggests a relatively low importance of venture
capital in other industries compared with the biotechnology industry.
<insert Table 5 around here>
The figures in Table 5 indicate major differences in financing the three different
parts of the biotechnology value chain. The scopes of product companies are deeply
in the focus of venture capital companies as we assumed in hypothesis 1: 30.9
                                                                                                                                         
focus on the product strategy of biotechnology companies.
16
percent of them received equity only from venture capitalists. Additionally, 3.6
percent of biotechnology product companies receiving a combination of industry
investments and venture capital add up to just 3.6 percent in the sample. Stand alone
investments of corporate investors are detected for only 3.6 percent of product
companies. The rest of the Product companies, almost 62 percent track a different
financing model which has nothing to do with venture capital or equity funding by
established firms.
A closer look on the repartition of venturing partner types according to business
sectors emphasizes a clear orientation on red biotechnology (Table 6).
<insert Table 6 around here>
This picture  is more distinct if we concentrate our analysis on product companies
(Table 7). Almost 38 percent of the product companies in red biotechnology
received VC whereas product companies from the green and gray sectors did not
attract any. That is to say, VC-companies favor product companies focusing on
health care applications which are even more attractive  than investments in green or
gray biotechnology.
<insert Table 7 around here>
Nevertheless, some companies are financed by a combination of corporate venture
capital and venture capital (4.4 percent). Investments by corporate investors  like
chemical or pharmaceutical firms only represent 2.2 percent of all product
companies from the healthcare (“red”) sector, which is quite low compared with
venture capitalists.
To sum up, we detect a low importance of equity funding by corporate investors
within the high-tech biotechnology industry. The share of funded firms is much
lower compared with venture capitalists (hypothesis 3). In contrast, a low rate of
venturing by venture capitalists as well as a high rate of participation by corporate
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investors in the supplying industry is evident. Some established firms identify
biotechnology as a new market niche offering attractive opportunities for their
existing products, which is clearly in accordance with our expectations (hypothesis
2).
5 Econometric Analysis
Econometric Approach
The presence of a private equity partner is not only affected by the business model.
Many other factors can potentially determine the financing structure. Hence, the
different use of private equity by product, service and supplier companies can
potentially be affected by differences in other variables. Our goal is to find out
whether the business model is really related to the probability of receiving venture
capital as well as capital by incumbent firms. An appropriate empirical method to
estimate the probability for different types of financing structure is the multinomial
logit model (MNL). Typically, MNL’s starting point is the choice between
alternatives.22 The MNL describes the relation between determinants and different
types of corporate financing structure as follows:
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The parameter vector β varies between the types of finance g, indicating how an
exogenous variable xi affects the probability P for a company i to receive venture
capital, to gain a corporate investor or to be independent. In the descriptives we had
an additional fourth alternative: syndicated investment of VC-company and
                                          
22 Choice has to be interpreted as realized alternative, resulting from the supply and demand  for
private equity. We consider an one stage game, because asking for equity yes or not is
unobservable.
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corporate investor. However, reasoned by insufficient number of cases (N=10) we
included this alternative in one specification to the alternative “VC-company” in
another specification to the alternative “Corporate Investor”.
An assumption of the econometric model is that the error terms iε  is independent
and identically type I extreme value distributed. This implies a severe restriction for
our empirical model, which is known as the independence of irrelevant alternatives
(IIA). According to the IIA, the ratios of the probabilities of any two choices do not
depend on the presence of other choices in the choice set. The IIA assumption is
tested using the well known test suggested by Hausman and McFadden (1984) (see
e.g. Greene, 1997, p.920f.). First, we checked whether the realized financing
structure “Involvement of incumbent firm” is independent of the realized alternative
“Independent”, if we exclude alternative “Receiving venture capital”. Secondly, we
tested the independence of last mentioned alternative from the status of financing
structure “Independent”. Test statistics for the first test (χ²(16) = 0.51;
[Prob>χ²(16)] = 1.00) as well as the second test (χ²(16) = 0.72;
[Prob>χ²(16)] = 1.00) clearly show that the IIA hypothesis does not have to be
rejected in our model. Thus, we can conclude that the disturbances in our model are
independent and homoscedastic and hence, model estimates are unbiased, efficient
and consistent.
Estimation Results
Table 8 contains the descriptive statistics for considered variables, Table 9 shows the
results of MNL-Estimation. Presentation and interpretation of results in MNL-
models are usually based on the coefficient estimates (see Greene, 1997, p. 916).
Variables of main interest are listed in the first rows. Control variables are listed
under the heading “Other Firm Characteristics” and “Firm’s Environment”.
Product and service companies have a higher probability to receive venture capital
compared to the group of suppliers on the one hand. On the other hand, companies
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that are active in the red sector have a higher probability to be venture capital-
backed than companies from the green or grey business fields. An alternative
specification considers the interaction between both variables. The coefficient
estimates are significant higher when we take an interaction term, product and
service companies in the red business area, into account. The results confirm clearly
our hypothesis 1, VC-companies are strongly oriented in financing high-risk
projects. High market volume and expected high growth of a market for health care
lead to high attention on the red sector by venture capitalists.
Product and service companies have a significant lower probability to gain an
external corporate investor as venturing partner than supplier companies. Strikingly,
companies in red biotechnology have no significant higher probability to acquire
corporate investors as equity investors than companies in other business fields.
Corporate investors avoid equity financing of high risk projects as we expected in
hypothesis 3. Other instruments seem to be more important for established firms to
use the window on technology in this area. Besides the development of new research
tools, the high market potential of pharmaceutical products make this sector
attractive for investments in the supplying industry by incumbents.
The results are partly sensitive as we count the syndicated investments by VC-
companies and established firms to the group of corporate investors alternatively.
Now, a significant lower probability of firms in the category “Developing new
products” to achieve equity funding by corporate investors can not be observed. The
results give some evidence for the crucial contribution of common project evaluation
by VC-companies and corporate investors within the area of high-tech projects.
Product companies can easier acquire equity funding when financial intermediaries
as well as potential customers are involved in project evaluation. Syndication helps
to reduce the risk of selecting a bad project (Locket and Wright, 2001), which has a
particular importance for the evaluation of high-tech investments.
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Furthermore, other firm characteristics affect the probability to receive venture
capital. A high science based background or affinity to science is assumed for
founders with the title of Ph. D. or Professor. Firms with this type of founders have a
higher probability to receive VC. The reason is that they have access to more tacit
knowledge and can perform better in sense of innovation activities and firm growth
(Zucker et al., 1998; Zucker et al.,  2002). This is especially important for venture
capitalists’ expectations about venture’s revenue. The availability of patents has also
a certain impact on gathering venture capital. Patents are our second measure for
firms’ innovation level. Compared with the first indicator, patents signalize the
success of the innovation process and/or the importance to protect new innovative
ideas. Both is directly related with expectations of high revenues. Similar 63 percent
of venture capital-backed biotechnology firms have one or more patents.
Biotechnology start-ups founded in 1997 and 1998 have a higher probability to
receive venture capital than those founded in 1995 (the reference group). In the
boom of the VC-market, the role of government supported activities as well as the
supply of more attractive business ideas from the VC’ point of view are the main
reasons for this empirical fact. Larger biotechnology companies are more amenable
to receive venture capital. The negative correlation between start-up size and
survival rate as well as the expectation that large firms are more able and efficient to
organize the innovation process motivate VC’s to invest in large-scaled companies.
The final version contains one variable to measure the ability of the region to
support the innovation process of biotechnology firms via co-operations and
informal network activities. Start-ups in regions with a high level of R&D
employees in industry have a higher probability to receive a VC-company as a
venturing partner. In these regions we can expect some more corporate spin-offs
from incumbents. These spin-offs are most attractive for VC-companies (for
empirical evidence see Mackewicz & Partner, 2002). Alternatively, we consider the
number of patents of science in counties and a dummy variable  indicating the
location in a region which took part at the BioRegio contest of the German Federal
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Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) in 1995. Both variables are
insignificant, detecting no better equity supply conditions in BioRegio counties
compared with the other ones. The three mentioned variables are highly correlated
which hinders a common consideration.
< insert Table 9 around here >
6 Conclusion
The paper has focused on a comparison between activities of venture capital
companies and those of non-financial external companies to finance German biotech
start-ups founded between 1995 and 1999 in early stages. The descriptive and
multivariate analysis emphasize a substantial importance of venture capital finance
as funding source for biotech companies developing new products and technologies
in the therapeutic and diagnostic fields, known as high-risk biotech companies. 42
percent of them received venture capital in early stage. On the contrary, only few
low-risk supplier companies are equity funded by venture capitalists. The market
potential for their products is limited and offers few chances for added value
creation. Venture capital is particularly critical for early stages financing of high-risk
biotechnology companies. Someone could interpret the result for product companies
in the opposite direction: Venture capital is not important, because 58 percent do not
have it. We hold two arguments against this interpretation. First, only a small share
of all asking firms receive venture capital reasoned by a sophisticated selection
procedure of venture capitalists. Second, the share is conspicuously higher compared
with high-tech industries in general. The share of venture-backed firms related to all
young firms is about two percent in high-tech industries.
Biotechnology companies developing new research technologies or products
(diagnostic kits, therapeutic compounds – from target identification to pre-clinical
and clinical testing) are of special interest for incumbents in pharmaceutical and
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chemical industry. However, our empirical results suggest that they are rarely active
as venturing partners for these high-risk biotech companies. We think that higher
attractiveness of alternative strategies such as collaborations, acquisition in later
stages and high amount of internal R&D are the main reason for this observation.
Their strategy can be characterized as a “wait-and-see” attitude or option model to
be present in case of a successful innovation process. This (direct) contribution to
reduce the financing gap at the time of foundation is comparably low. However,
their activities are an important signal for venture capitalists to evaluate the market
potential of business ideas and hence, indirectly affect the probability of closing the
financing gap. On the contrary, incumbents are more involved as venturing partners
in low-risk biotech companies, e.g. suppliers for biotech companies which deal with
target and technology development process. Occupying strategic market with well-
known demand seems to be particular attractive for incumbents with similar
activities.
The result applies for a boom stage in the venture capital cycle and the formative
stage of the modern German biotechnology industry. A lower importance of venture
capital can be expected for biotechnology firms founded after the year 2000.
Nowadays, young and new biotechnology companies are experiencing increasing
difficulties in acquiring external equity after the crash of stock-markets. Venture
capital companies tend to invest more in later stages and focus on follow-up
investments. Furthermore, the quality of their selection procedure has drastically
increased. Due to the significant role of venture capital investments in the birth of
the biotechnology industry, an ongoing restraint from venture capitalist seems to be
problematic for the further development of existing biotech companies and the
financing of new ones.
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Appendix
Table 1: Investment Strategy of Corporate Investors and Venture Capital Companies
VC Industry
Large enterprises Small-medium
enterprises
Goal Financial goal Primarily strategic goal
Investment duration 3-5 years 5-10 years (possibly longer)
Type of Investment Private equity Private equity, milestone/royalty payments
for successful innovation process
Investment focus Broad investment
range
Market Niches or new technologies
(defined by strategic relevance)
Risk-adversity and
their components
Risk adversity Low Medium High
Risk pooling High High Low
Risk diversification High Low Low
Risk specialization High High High
Table 2: Share of Venture-Backed Firms Related to the Potential Demand for VC
Hightech-
Manufacturing
Other
Manufacturing
Hightech-
Services
Consul-
ting
Other
Services
Trade Construc-
tion
All
2.18 % 1.03 % 2.22 % 0.93 % 0.45 % 0.62 % 0.17 % 0.85 %
Remark: Share is equal the quotient from Start-ups between 1996 and 1999 receiving venture capital until
the end of 2001 divided by the potential demand for VC. Potential demand for VC: Start-ups founded
between 1996 and 1999, legal form of limited liability, business activities in five-digit NACE-Codes in
which one or more venture-backed firms are active. Hightech-Manufacturing and Hightech-Services
according the average R&D as well as innovation intensity in five-digit NACE-Codes (Engel and Fryges
2002).
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Table 3: Aggregation of Firm’s Business Models to three classes for the descriptive analysis
Developing new
products
Offering
services
Supplier
activities
Class #
1 0 0 Product company 55
0 1 0 Service company 71
1 1 0 Service company 68
0 0 1 Supplier company 82
0 1 1 Supplier company 36
1 0 1 Supplier company 33
1 1 1 Supplier company 33
Table 4: Business Model and Business Fields of German Companies in Biotechnology
Industry (Founded Between 1995 and 1999)
Red Green Gray Unknown
Product company 45 7 2 1
Service company 116 10 7 6
Supplier company 142 11 10 21
Number of companies 303 28 19 28
Table 5: Venturing Partner Types According to Business Models (in Percent of Column
Sum)
Product Service Supplier All
Venture Capital 30.9 21.5 6.5 15.6
Venture Capital &
Corporate investor 3.6 5.0 0.5 2.6
Corporate investor 3.6 7.9 13.5 10.0
None 61.8 65.4 79.3 71.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Number of companies 55 139 184 378
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Table 6: Venturing Partner Types According to Business Field (in Percent of the Column
Sum)
Red Green Gray All companies
Venture Capital 18.2 7.1 0 16.3
Venture Capital &
Corporate investor 3.3 0 0 2.9
Corporate investor 8.9 10.7 26.3 10.0
None 69.6 82.1 73.7 70.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Number of companies 303 28 19 350
Table 7: Venturing Partner Types According to Business Field – only Product Companies -
(in Percent of the Column Sum)
Red Green Gray All product
companies
Venture Capital 37.7 0.0 0.0 31.4
Venture Capital &
Corporate investor 4.4 0.0 0.0 3.7
Corporate investor 2.2 14.2 0.0 3.7
None 55.5 85.7 100.0 61.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Number of companies 45 7 2 54
31
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics of Exogenous Variables
Exogenous Variables Mean Standard deviation
Business model and Business field 1)
Developing new products 0.150 0.358
Offering services 0.195 0.397
Supplying activities and developing new products 0.078 0.269
Offering services and developing new products 0.198 0.399
Supplying activities, offering services and
developing new products 0.093 0.291
Supplying activities and offering services 0.090 0.287
Business Field: Red Biotechnology 0.802 0.399
Other Firm Characteristics 2)
Doctor/Professor 0.685 0.465
Patent 0.378 0.486
Start-up Size (number of employment) (ln) 1.465 1.282
Founded in 1996 0.186 0.390
Founded in 1997 0.228 0.420
Founded in 1998 0.252 0.435
Founded in 1999 0.174 0.380
Firm‘s Environment
Location in Bioregio 3) 0.553 0.498
R&D employees in county (ln) 4) 7.000 1.779
Number of patents (Science) in county (ln) 5) 4.575 1.672
Remark: 1) BIOCOM database, 2) ZEW-Foundation Panel, 3) Own inquiry, 4) Statistic of Bundesanstalt für
Arbeit, 5) Greif (1998).
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Table 9: Determinants of the Probability of Firm's Venturing Partner
Selected Venturing Partner VC-company1) Corporate investor
Exogenous Variables coeff. st-error coeff. st-error
Business model and Business field
Developing new products 1.991 0.992 ** -1.699 0.757 **
Offering services 2.058 0.963 ** -0.656 0.614
Developing new products and supplying
activities 1.679 1.009 * -1.226 0.808
Developing new products and offering
services 1.214 0.959 -1.909 0.786 **
Supplying activities, offering services and
developing new products 0.753 0.978 -2.419 1.044 **
Supplying activities and offering services -0.129 1.398 0.150 0.534
Business Field: Red Biotechnology 1.270 0.559 ** -0.515 0.429
Other Firm Characteristics
Doctor/Professor 1.819 0.553 *** -0.168 0.458
Patent 0.913 0.335 *** 0.534 0.455
Start-up Size (ln) 0.320 0.138 ** 0.142 0.147
Founded in 1996 0.992 0.690 1.005 0.624
Founded in 1997 1.640 0.650 ** 1.070 0.622 *
Founded in 1998 1.300 0.636 ** 0.404 0.638
Founded in 1999 1.154 0.732 -0.644 0.782
Firm‘s Environment
R&D employees in county (ln) 0.169 0.098 * 0.075 0.124
Intercept -8.551 1.396 *** -1.956 1.160 *
Number of observation 333
Log-Likelihood -218.39
Pseudo R² (Likelihood Ratio Index) 0.206
*** significant on the 1%-level, ** significant on the 5%-level, * significant on the 10%-level;
Base category: independent companies. 1) Syndicated investments between VC-company and corporate
investor are included. Reference group: Firm with supplying activities, in green or gray business field, no
Ph.D or professor within founder’s team, no patent, founded in 1995. Results of MNL estimation with
heteroscedastic robust standard errors.
